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THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACTAN APPRAISAL
Louis W. KOENIG
The National Labor Relations Act is not a completely new governmental
experiment in the field of labor relations. Rather, it is the logical development of the many years during which various techniques of dealing with
the problem of labor relations have been utilized by the Federal Government. Since, with the development of industry, there has been a concurrent
increase in industrial disputes, government has become interested in their
prevention and satisfactory settlement. Legislation regulating labor relations in the railroad industry has been comparatively successful. An attempt at large-scale regulation was made in the National Industrial Recovery
Act with section 7 (a), but difficulties of interpretation and enforcement
made the practicability of such regulation highly questionable. Two months
after the downfal of the National Recovery Act, the National Labor Relations Act was passed,' embodying in statute form section 7 (a). The Act
is predicated on the fact that the denial by employers of the right of employees
to organize and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective
bargaining has led to strikes and other forms of industrial unrest burdensome
to commerce.

2

To protect the. worker's right of self-organization for the purposes of
collective bargaining, the Adt outlaws the specific "unfair labor practices"
on the part of the employer which would interfere with that right. Accordingly, the employer is forbidden "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
29 U. S. C. A. §§ 151-66. For general discussions of the Act see
Garrison, The National Labor Relations Act (1935) 24 SuRvEY G. 596; Hardy, The
National Labor Relations Act (1937) 12 Los ANGELES B. A. B. 288; Larry and Cowley,
The National Labor Relations Act (1936) 3 U. OF PITT. L. REv. 33; MacDonald, Tile
National Labor Relations Act (1936) 26 AM. Ec. REv. 412; Smith, The National Labor
Relations Act (1937) 10 OHIo ST. B. A. REP. 199; Spencer, The National Labor Relations
Act (1936) 30 ILL. L. R. 884; Henderson, Sidelights on the National Labor Relations Act
(1937) 42 COMM. L. J. 163.
'Section 1. For discussions concerning the loss in wages, trade, and commerce caused
by strikes, cf. Commission for Inquiry for the Interchurch World Movement Report
(1920); COMMONS AND ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION, (1920) 125;
149 STAT. 449.

DAUGHERTY,

LABOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY,

Analysis of Strike Statistics (1923)

(1933)

356-36-; Douglas, An

JOURNAL OF AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION

866-877; FITCH, CAUSES OF INDUSTRIAL UNREST (1924); HAMMOND AND JENKS, GREAT
AMERICAN ISSUES (1921) 99; KING, THE NATIONAL INCOME AND ITS PURCHASING

POWER (1930) 56; National Association of Manufacturers, Convention Proceedings
(1926) 136; OLDS, THE HIGH COST OF STRIKES (1921) 210; The Board of Inquiry for the
Cotton Textile Industr.v Report (1934) ; Report of the Steel Strike of 1919; Strikes and
Lockouts in the United States, 1916-1932, (1933) 36 MON. LABOR REv. 1295; (1934) 39
MON. LABOR REv. 62; (1935) 40 MON. LABOR REv. 677; U. S. Coal Commission, Labor
Relations in the Bituinnous Coal Industry (1923) ; Report of the Anthracite Coal Strike
Commission, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. no. 46 (1903) ; U. S. Commissioner
of Labor, Twenty-First Annual Report: Strikes and Lockouts (1906).

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
employees in the exercise of their rights of self-organization," to "dominate
or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization
or contribute financial or other support to it"; or "by discrimination in regard
to hire or tenure of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization." 3 To enforce these provisions, the Act establishes
a National Labor Relations Board 4 which, after proper hearing and examination, may order an employer to "cease and desist" from unfair practices. 5
To make the Act more effective, the Board is given power to order the
reinstatement of employees discharged because of union membership or
union activities. 6 The ultimate enforcement of the Board's orders rests
7
with the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Act provides further that the representatives selected "by the majority"
of the employees in a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining, "shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such
unit."8 In disputes concerning the appropriate unit, the Board is to decide
whether "the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof"
is to be the proper one for the purposes of representation. 9 Whenever
necessary, the Board is to conduct an election to select representatives and
certify the name or names of representatives that have been designated
or selected.' 0
Since the Department of Labor is an executive department and the functions and duties of the Board are of a quasi-judicial nature, the two obviously
fall into different departmental categories. With marked consistency, Congress, when defining a policy and creating a quasi-judicial body to carry it
out, has recognized that that body should not be subject to the control of
an executive department because of this incompatibility of purpose and
method of functioning. The same independent departmental status which
the National Labor Relations Board enjoys has previously been given to.
a number of administrative boards. The Communications Division, the
Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission are
independent of the Department of Commerce; the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation and the Securities Exchange Commission of the Treasury
Department; and of the Department of Labor itself, the National Mediation
Board.
While Congress has made the Board independent of the Department of
'Section 8.
'Section 3.
'Section 10 (c).
'Section 10 (c).
'Section 10 (e).
'Section 9 (a).
'Section 9 (b).
"Section 9 (c). See The Nature of the Authority of the National Labor Relations
Board (1937) 17 BosT. UxIv. L. Rzv. 843.
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Labor, care has been taken to prevent it from trespassing on the rightful
duties and activities of the Department itself. Hence, the Board is not permitted to act as mediator or conciliator in labor disputes. The function of
mediation and conciliation, under the Act, still remains in the Conciliation
Service of the Department of Labor."1
Having described the National Labor Relations Act in broad outline and
having indicated the position of the administrative board it establishes in
regard to the Department of Labor, it remains to consider the jurisdiction of
the Board as defined by the Supreme Court and to examine the interpretation
of the Act made by the Board in its decisions and orders. Finally, an attempt
will be made to show the bearing of the Act on a future labor policy.
I.

THE JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

In passing the Act, Congress assumed that the board's jurisdiction would
extend to those manufacturing businesses which ship their finished products
in interstate and foreign commerce.' 2 Included in the sphere of authority
are all instrumentalities of interstate commerce and those businesses with
branches and divisions in all parts of the country, operating as a unit on a
national scale.' 3 The employees of businesses purely local in character, government employees, agricultural laborers, domestic servants, and persons
employed by parents are specifically excluded from the regulations of the
4
Act.
The advisability and constitutional justification for such regulation was
clearly stated by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in the Jones and Laughlin decision, in which he found the Commerce Clause broad enough to sanction
federal regulation of a vertically integrated business enterprise with wide
interstate ramifications. The Court declared:
"Where industries organize themselves on a national scale, making
their relation to interstate commerce the dominant factor in their activities, how can it be maintained that their industrial labor relations constitute a forbidden field into which Congress may not enter when it is
necessary to protect interstate commerce from the paralysing consequences of industrial war?"15
In the cases which came before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act,' 6 the decision in the bus case was unanimous, while
'Section 4 (a).
"See the Congressional findings in Section 1 of the Act. See also SEN. REP. No. 573,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 18 (1935) ; and speech by Congressman Connery on the floor
of the House, June 3, 1935; 79 CONG. REc. 8537, 8539 (1935).
"Mueller, Businesses Subject to the National Labor Relations Act, (1937) 35 MicH.
L. REv. 1286.

"Section 2 (3).

-(1937) 4 U. S. L. W. at 970.
"National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U. S.
1 (April 12, 1937) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U. S.
49, 58 (April 12, 1937); Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. National
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the four dissenters in the Associated Press case viewed the Act as an abridgment of the freedom of the press; and in the three "processing" cases there
was a sharp conflict over the Commerce Clause. It is unquestionable that
the employees concerned in these cases were not engaged in interstate commerce; their activities were wholly intrastate. Hence the problem was to
determine whether or not their activities were sufficiently related to interstate
commerce to warrant Congressional regulation. In previous cases,' 7 the
Court had declared that local activities must have a direct effect upon interstate commerce in order to come under national regulation. In determining
this, the causal connection between the activities and the effect on interstate
commerce are traced, and if an intermediate link in the causal chain is found,
Congress may not regulate the local activities.' 8 Therefore, the first test
which the Court may apply to determine the justification of Congressional
regulation is to answer the question: Is the effect direct or indirect? If
direct, regulation is justified.' 9
The second test which the Court has applied in earlier cases is that of
seeing whether the effect on interstate commerce is great or substantial.20
Thus in Stafford v. Wallace,21 the regulation of purely local activities by
Congress was sustained under the Commerce Clause; for the Court looked
upon the stock yards, to use its metaphor, as a throat through which passed
Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 142 (April 12, 1937); Associated Press v. National
Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S.103 (April 12, 1937). For discussion of the decisions
see Yorkey, ConstitutionalLaw-Interstate Commerce-National Labor Relations Cases
(1937) 22 CORNELL L. Q. 568; Constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act
(1936) 4 U. OF CHIc. L. REv. 109; Nathanson, The Wagner Act Decisions Studied in
Retrospect (1937) 32 ILL. L. REv..196; The Present Status of the National Labor Relations Act (1936) 5 INTERNATL. JURIDIcAL Ass'N. BULL. 25; Woods and Wheatley,
The Wagner Act Decisions-A Charter of Liberty for Labor? (1937) 5 GEo. WASH.
L. 7REv. 845.
" United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895) ; A. L. A. Schechter Co. v.
United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1937) ; Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 298 U. S. 238
(1937).
1
Avakian, The National Labor Relations Decisions in the United States Supreme
Court (1937) 25 CALIF. L. REv. 593 at 595.
"'In the Sugar Trust Case United States v. E. C. Knight supra note 17 the Court
held that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act could not be applied to a combination of manufacturers processing 98% of the sugar of the country, on the ground that manufacture
was not directly related to interstate commerce. This view was rejected in Standard Oil
Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S.1, 68 (1911) and United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106 (1911). The most recent application of this point of
view has been made in the Schechter and Carter decisions. In the Schechter decision
(at 308) Mr. Chief Justice Hughes said:
...where the effect of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce is merely
indirect, such transactions remain within the domain of state power. . . . The
distinction between direct and indirect effects ... must be recognized as a fundamental
one, essential to the maintenance of our constitutional system."
'See Houston, East and West Texas R. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S.342 (1914),
where the Court held that Congress may regulate rates for
wholly
(1926),in
U. S.153traffic,
271intrastate
States,
order to protect interstate traffic; and Colorado v. United
where it was held that Congress, despite the objection of the State government, may
compel abandonment by interstate carrier of a wholly intrastate branch line.
2258 U. S.495 (1922).
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the flow of interstate commerce. Prior to this case, the second interpretation
of the Commerce Clause had been used with deadly effect on labor interests.
Since in the Danbury Hatters cases and others of a similar nature, 22 the
Court has held that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act applies under the Commerce
Clause to combinations of workers who were not engaged in interstate
commerce on the ground that they have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce if they cease their work by striking, it is ironical that the Court
should now find in this same method of interpretation the justification for
Congressional protection of labor's right to organize and bargain collectively.
Indeed, if Congress has the power to prohibit strikes, boycotts, and other
activities local in nature which have the effect of curtailing interstate commerce, why may it not accomplish the same end by going to the root of the
evil and removing the cause of strikes, which is the principal objective of
the Act ?23

The problem remains to determine the jurisdiction of the Board according
to the principle of "substantial effect." Clearly, Congress may regulate
those enterprises which depend upon other states for raw materials and a
market for the finished product. A second group, those obtaining raw
materials from local sources and selling outside the state, are included, for
their labor difficulties may burden the free flow of commerce just as effectively
as those of the second group. The Court has taken this position when it said
that "the fact that the means operated at one end before physical transportation commenced and at the other end" after the physical transportation ended
24
was immaterial.
The cases decided by the Court indicate fairly dearly the scope of Congressional jurisdiction. By the Associated Press case, the Court countenanced the
extension of the Act to all forms of interstate communication, radio, telegraph, telephone, transportation by air and water, and transmission of oil,
gas and electricity. Although the person or company may be engaged in
intrastate activity, interruption of that activity may obstruct interstate activity. 25

In the Fruehauf and Friedman-HarryMarks cases, the Court held

'Lowe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908); Lawlor v. Lowe, 235 U. S. 522 (1915);

Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n., 274 U. S. 37 (1927);
Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers 268 U. S. 295 (1925).
'See Jones and Laughlin decision supra note 16 at 627.
'Lowe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 at 301, 28 Sup. Ct. 301 (1908). See Mueller, Businesses Subject to the National Labor Relations Act (1937) 35 MicH. L. REv. 1286 at
1290.
'Associated Press v. N. L. R. B., 301 U. S. 103, 57 Sup. Ct. 650 at 654 (1937). In
re Consolidated Edison Co., 4 N. L. R. B. no. 10, the Board held that although the
respondent company which provided power for railroads, navigation in New York
harbor, United States post-offices, telephone, telegraph, and radio systems, airports,
etc., was engaged in intrastate activity; nevertheless, a cessation in its operations
because of a strike would have a severe effect on its consumers engaging in interstate
activity. The Board said:
". .. a labor dispute between the respondents and their employees interrupting
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that the principles announced in the Jones and Laughlin case were applicable
to manufacturing concerns which are relatively small when compared with
the enterprise involved in the Jones and Laughlin situation.2 6
it is interesting to note that since the Supreme Court decisions, the Board
has been highly successful in securing the enforcement of its orders in the
Circuit Court of Appeals. In no case has an order of the Board been set
aside on the ground that it lacked proper jurisdiction. 27 A difficult test of
the adequacy of the Court's interpretation may come, however, when a conthe respondents' operations would not only affect the flow of the large quantities
of coal and oil which they receive in interstate commerce, but might be substantially equivalent to the effect on interstate and foreign commerce and communication
which would be caused by simultaneous labor disputes in the respondents' business
and in all the businesses served by the respondents that are engaged in operating
the instrumentalities of interstate and foreign commerce and communication and all
the businesses engaged in shipping and receiving commodities in interstate or
foreign commerce."
Because of this substantial relationship to commerce and communication among the
several states and with foreign countries, the Board held that the case fell within its
jurisdiction.
The Court applies the general principle that the Board has jurisdiction when
"stoppage of ... operations by industrial strife" would result in substantial interruption
to the flow of interstate commerce. Where such interruption would occur, the Court has
indicated, unfair labor practices on the part of the employer known to be "prolific
causes of strife" have a "close and intimate relation to interstate commerce" and are subject to Federal regulation under the Act. 301 U. S. at 41-43.
-'See National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines Inc., 91
F (2d) 178 (C. C. A. 3d 1936). and N. L. R. B. v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 91
F. (2d) 485 (C. C. A. 9th 1936), where the application of the Act to bus drivers and
garage and maintenance men employed by interstate bus lines was sustained. In
N. L. R. B. v. Tidewater Express Lines, Inc., 90 F. (2d) 301 (C. C. A. 4th 1937), an
order of the Board requiring an interstate truck operator to reinstate with back pay
drivers whom the Board found were discharged in violation of the Act was affirmed.
In Jeffery-DeWitt Insulator Co. v. N. L. R. B., 91 F. (2d) 134 (C. C. A. 4th 1937),
the Court upheld an order of the Board directed to a small manufacturer of insulators
employing from 82 to 166 persons, which imported in interstate and foreign commerce
857 in value of its raw materials, and sold in interstate commerce about 90% in value
of its finished products. In Renown Stove Co. v. N. L. R. B., 90 F. (2d) 1017 (C. C.
A. 6th 1937), the Court affirmed the application of the Act to a company employing
from 175 to-250 men, which receives about half its raw materials from outside the state
and ships out fifty-five per cent of its products. In N. L. R. B. v. Santa Cruz Fruit
Packing Co., 91 F. (2d) 790 (C. C. A. 9th 1937), the Court affirmed the Board's order
which was directed against a company engaged in the canning and packing of fruits and
vegetables, "substantially all" of which were grown in the state in which the plant is
located. About 39% of its products are shipped to other states and foreign countries.
In Lyons v. Eagle-Picher Lead Co., 90 F. (2d) 321 (C. C. A. 10th 1937), the Board
issued a complaint against a company engaged in mining and in smelting, refining, and
further processing of the ores mined. Prior to the Supreme Court dbcisions the District
Court had granted a temporary injunction restraining the Board's agents from prosecuting the case. Upon appeal, after the Supreme Court decisions, the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court and ordered a dismissal of the
bill of complaint, declaring that the Board "was proceeding within its lawful powers".
The application of the Act to oil producing operations has been sustained in N. L. R. B.
v. Bell Oil and Gas Co., 91 F. (2d) 509 (C. C. A. 5th 1937), wherein the Court declared:
"The Act is not confined in its jurisdiction to industries operating upon a nationwide scale. It extends to and embraces within its scope all activities, large or small,
which are, or which affect "commerce" as defined by it. By every test of the decisions
the commerce power exerted in the Act extended to this dispute, and to those involved in it."
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flict of jurisdiction arises between the national board and the various boards
now being created by the states.28 Already in Wisconsin, New York, and
Utah, state boards have been established to apply legislation substantially
similar to the National Labor Relations Act. While these acts are serving
the very useful purpose of supplementing the federal act, it is apparent
that a conflict over jurisdiction may occur. If so, there will be a real danger
of a protracted period of litigation when the employer brought before a state
court claims that his case belongs to the federal board and vice versa.
It has been suggested that the national act be amended to provide that
until the national board has exercised jurisdiction in a given case affecting
interstate commerce, state labor relations acts should apply and the federal
courts should not be permitted to entertain petitions for the removal of
proceedings' instituted in state courts under these acts. Such a provision
would enable the national board to concentrate on the more important cases
which are unquestionably under federal jurisdiction and would leave the
less important ones together with those not so clearly under federal jurisdiction to state boards, or at least to those boards which functioned effectively
and conformed to national policy.2 9 In all such cases the state boards could
proceed with unchallenged power in their own courts, as well as avert the
probably long period of litigation which seems imminent if a number of state
boards are established.

II. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE AcT BY

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

BOARD

A.

Collective,Bargaining

The right of labor to organize has long been recognized by the Courts.
Chief Justice Hughes, in the Jones and Laughlin decision, said:
"Employees have as clear a right to organize and select their representatives for lawful purposes as the respondent has to organize its business and
select its own officers and agents. Discrimination and coercion to prevent the
free exercise of the right of employees to self-organization and representation is a proper subject for condemnation by competent legislative authority
Long ago we stated the reasons for labor organizations. We said that
they were organized out of the necessity of the situation; that a single
employee was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and
family; that if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought
fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employment and resist

See The State Labor
2UTAH LAWS 1937, c. 55, 117; WiscoNsIN LAws 1937, c. 51.
Relations Acts (1938) 5 HAav. L. REv. 722.
'Garrison, Government and Labor-the Latest Phase (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 896 at
900. For a discussion of the possible methods of cooperation between the federal and
state governments, see Koenig, Federal and State Cooperation under the Constitution,
(1938) 36 MIcE. L. REv. 752 ff.
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arbitrary and unfair treatment; that union was essential to'30give laborers
opportunity to deal on an equality with their employers.
Once a given body of labor has organized itself into a unit and has elected
its representatives, it is prepared to bargain collectively. Collective bargaining is a means to an end-collective agreement. Such an agreement
necessarily will concern wages, hours, and working conditions. It will have
a fixed duration of existence thus stabilizing, for a certain period, the terms
of employment, and thereby bring mutual advantages and protection to employer and employee alike. By contrast, collective bargaining may be unsuccessful, resulting in no agreement; for as the Board has stated in Sands
Manufacturing Company,3 1 "from the duty of the employer to bargain collectively there does not flow any duty on the part of the employer to accede
to the demands of his employees."
When no agreement has resulted from meetings between the employer
and representatives of the employees, the Board must determine whether genuine collective bargaining has taken place. It must decide whether the employer
has sought to fulfill the letter of the law by merely discussing the issues
perfunctorily, and, by the employment of dilatory tactics, has thwarted the
ultimate purposes of collective bargaining.
The first requirement the Board makes of the employer who fails to
reach an agreement with his employees through the ordinary processes of
collective bargaining is to show that he negotiated in good faith.3 2 It is the
theory of the Act that if the employer is willing to sit down with representatives of the unions and negotiate in good faith, in frank discussion, the
natural result will be satisfactory agreements, in many instances, and, consequently, a decrease in the amount of industrial disputes. The criterion
which the Board has used to determine good faith has been the offering of
counter-proposals by the employer. In St. Joseph Stock Yards Company,3 3
the Board found the respondent willing at all times to meet with representatives of the employees, to discuss fully their requests, and to state the respondent's views on each request. Discussion at these conferences, however,
was confined solely to the proposals of the union, since the respondent company did not offer counter-proposals when rejecting the union's demands.
It justified such an attitude by its unwillingness to make any changes in
the conduct of its business because of its inability to bear any increase in
expenses. The Board found further that the respondent refused to enter
into any agreement, oral or written, with representatives of its employees,
'National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U. S.
1. See American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184,

209 (1921).

31 N. L. R. B. 557.
'See in re Bell Oil and Gas Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 562.
"2 N. L. R. B. 39.
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even when the proposed agreement covered only existing policy. While the
Board could not maintain on these facts that the respondent had refused
unqualifiedly to deal with the organization representing its employees, it did
not follow that the apparent willingness at all times to discuss working
4
conditions could be termed genuine collective bargaining.
If no agreement is possible, the Board must determine whei the duty of
the employer to bargain collectively has been fulfilled. In Jeffery De Witt
Company,3 5 the Board held that the employer is not required to continue
bargaining when negotiations already held indicate that to do so would be
futile. The principle stated was that after an impasse in negotiations has
been reached, the employer is justified in refusing to meet further with the employees on the ground that no agreement is possible. The Board took cognizance
of the possibility of a change in the circumstances with which the proposed
agreement was concerned. In the particular case under consideration, the
impasse was dissolved by the occurrence. of a strike and the intervention of
disinterested third persons. With circumstances so altered, the Board held
that the respondent must resume negotiations to fulfil the requirements of
collective bargaining.
In another instance, the employer had refused to bargain collectively on
the ground that a union representing the employees was negotiating not for
a change in the wage and hour scale, nor to improve working conditions, but
for a closed shop. In the Columbian Enameling case, 36 the Board held that
such a demand by the Union did not excuse the employer from bargaining.
Employers have also maintained that they have fulfilled the requirements of
collective bargaining when they deal with grievances on an individual basis,
instead of meeting with representatives of the, employees. In Atlantic Refining Companyf 7 and again in International Filter Company,3 8 the Board
has held that where a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit have
'See in re Atlas Mills. Inc., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 3, wherein the respondent employer
through delays, postponements, and his refusal to sign a written agreement, besides
making constant changes in the basis of negotiations, proved that he was not engaging
in genuine collective bargaining. See also in re Black Diamond Steamship Corporation, 3 N. L. R. B. no. 101, wherein the Board held that the willingness of the
respondent to meet with union representatives was of 'no importance in the face of his
closing down his plant in preference to negotiating with the union. In the Inland Steel
Company decision, the Board ruled that the respondent company, in refusing to put in
writing any agreements reached between itself and the union, did not fulfil the requirements of collective bargaining. The Board declared, "The representatives of the employees are not obliged to go through the process of negotiating understandings, when
they are informed that their objective, the written agreement, will never be conceded."
The Board has taken the position that "the reduction of collective agreements to writing
has become an integral element of the collective bargaining process." See N. Y. Times,
April 7, 1938, pp. 1, 10.
851 N. L. R. B. 618.
'In re Columbian Enameling and Stamping Co., 1. N. L. R. B. 181.
=1 N. L. R. B. 359.
=1 N. L. R. B. 489.
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designated representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining, the duty
of the employer as established in the Act remains undischarged by the mere
adjustment of individual grievances.
A further problem is to find whether the employer has been and is discharging his duty to bargain collectively when his workers resort to strike.
In Columbian Enameling Company,3 9 the Board found that since the Act
provides that employees do not cease to be such even when they are on strike,
the employer must still resort to collective bargaining; for collective bargaining is an instrument of industrial peace, and the need for its use is as
imperative during a strike as before. By means of its application, a settlement may be obtained.
B.

The Investigation and Certification of Representatives

Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act40 empowers the Board
to certify representatives only when a question concerning the representation
of employees has arisen. 4 ' The instances in which elections have been found
necessary are many and diverse. It may be that more than one labor organization exists among the employees and that the employer deals with
one to the exclusion of the others,4 2 or it may be that the employer is dealing
4
with each of the organizations as the representative of its membership.
The question may also arise where only one labor organization exists among
the employees, and the employer, while meeting with the organization,
refuses to recognize its right to act for all the employees. 44 The Board has
'1 N. L. R. B. 181. The respondent company refused to meet with a committee of
the strikers as it had promised, for the company was in a position to reopen its plant
and by so doing without negotiating at all with the union it would discourage active
support of the union.
In re Sands Manufacturing Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 557, the Board ruled that the respondent
was unjustified in failing to negotiate with a committee of strikers after a shut-down of
the plant.
'0 Sectioh 9 (c) : "Whenever a question affecting commerce arises concerning the representation of employees, the Board may investigate such controversy and certify to the
parties, in writing, the name or names of the representatives that have been designated
or selected. In any such investigation, the Board shall provide for an appropriate
hearing upon due notice, either in conjunction with a proceeding under section 10 or
otherwise, and may take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other suitable method
to ascertain such representatives."
'In cases where a demand to bargain collectively has been made and the employer
has refused to enter into negotiations, the employees may ask for an investigation and
certification under section 9 (c). A labor organization will resort to section 9 (c) when
it is uncertain of its right to represent a majority or when the propriety of the unit is
in question.
The Board may certify representatives with or without elections, depending upon the
circumstances of the case. In re John Blood and Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 371, the Board
certified on the basis of a petition signed by a majority of the eligible employees just
prior to the filing of a petition for investigation.
'See in re Pittsburgh Steel Co.. 1 N. L. R. B. 256: in re Dwight Manufacturing Co.,
1 N. L. R. B. 309.
'See in re Bendix Products Corporation, 1 N. L. R. B. 173.
"In re Saxon Mills, 1 N. L. R. B. 153; and in re American Tobacco Co., 2 N. L.
R. B. 198.
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accepted an admission by an employer that he does not know if a particular
labor organization represents a majority of the employees, as proving the
existence of the problem. 45 In a number of cases, this admission by the
employer is in the form of a demand that the labor organization secure a
certification from the Board before he will bargain with the organization
as the exclusive representative of his employees. 46 Again, the employer may
contend that certain agreements established a formula for the handling of
controversies, provide for wages, hours, and working conditions, and constitute a legal obligation to the employees who signed them. The Board has
held that such agreements could not prevent the holding of an election; for
the whole process of collective bargaining and unrestricted choice of representatives assumes the freedom of the employees to change their representatives, while at the same time continuing the existing agreements under which
47
the new representatives must function.
The most vexatious problem of elections has been how to determine the
will of the employee who desires individual bargaining. In an early decision,48 the Board ruled on the motion of a company that the voters be given
the privilege of expressing on the ballot a preference for individual bargaining. The Board denied this motion, declaring:
"It is not our function to hold elections in order to determine whether
employees desire individual rather than collective bargaining with their
employer. Employees desiring individual bargaining may either refrain
from voting or cast a blank ballot. The ballot to be used in this election will therefore not provide for a place in which a preference for
individual bargaining may be expressed. It will contain the names of
"In re New York and Cuba Mail Steamship Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 97.
"it re American Cyanamid and Chemical Corporation, 2 N. L. R. B. 881; in re
Motor Transport Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 492; in re R. C. A. Communications, Inc., 2
N. L. R. B. 1109. See in re Johns-Manville Products Corporation, 2 N. L. R. B.
1048, where the employer made a similar demand after the union refused to submit a list
of members to prove its claim.
In re Wadsworth Watch Case Co., 4 N. L. R. B. no. 67, the company refused to
enter any contract with any labor organization until the proper bargaining agency had
been determined and certified by the Board. Since much uncertainty prevails over the
appropriate unit, companies hesitate to bargain with representatives of the workers
until they have been certified by the Board. See also, in re Bishop and Co., 4 N. L. R.
B. no. 71, wherein the company refused to accept an offer of proof of majority representation by the union. In the investigation made by the Board, the complainant union
could offer no substantiating proof that it did represent a majority of the employees.
In re Shell Chemical Co., 4 N. L. R. B. no. 36, prior to May 26, 1936, the company
had entered into separate agreements with several crafts organizations affiliated with
the American Federation of Labor. The Oil Workers Union, affiliated with the Committee for Industrial Organization, wished to negotiate a contract with the company,
which was restricted to do so because of the previous controct. The company, however,
was willing to have the matter settled by the Board, agreeing to bargain in the future
with whatever organization represented a majority of the employees.
'See in re Swayne and Hoyt, Ltd., 2 N. L. R. B. 282; in re New England Transportation Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 130; in re Black Diamond Steamship Corporation, 2 N. L. R.
B. 241.
'in re International Mercantile Marine Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 384.
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the three labor organizations which claim to represent the engineers of
the company." 49
Such a position seems inconsistent with other rulings of the Board. In
election cases involving only one labor organization, the Board has directed
that an election be conducted to determine whether or not the employees
desired that union to represent them. The ballot in such cases provides a
space to vote for, and a space to vote against a named organization. In
Anterican France Line,5" the Board provided for a space on the ballot in
which the voter could indicate that he does not desire either of the named
organizations to represent him. In this space, which is indicated by the
words, "or by neither", the employee can vote against both labor organizations.
Obviously, a small number of employees voting "or by neither", may, in
some cases, prevent either of the designated unions from securing a majority.
The Act, however, does not require an unwilling majority of the employees
to bargain through representatives. It merely guarantees the right of the
majority to bargain collectively if it chooses to exercise it. If the opportunity to vote against the organizations named on the ballot were denied, a
majority might be forced against its will to accept representation by one or
other of the nominees. In Radio Corporationof America5 1 the Board held
that those who did not vote were presumed to acquiesce in the choice of
the majority of those who did vote, and thus any employee not desiring to
be represented by either designated union would not express that preference
by refraining from voting. In the recent Interlake case, 52 the Board provided for the "or by neither" phrase to be placed on the ballot, adding that
in the event that the election should result in none of the three preferences
obtaining a majority, it would, upon request of the labor organization receiving the greatest number of votes, promptly direct a run-off election in which3
the employees would be permitted to vote for or against the organization.5
As a matter of policy, the Board has been scrupulously careful not to be"Ibid. at 390.
'3 N. L. R. B. no. 45.
01 N. L. R. B. 384.
"Inre Interlake Iron Corporation, 4 N. L. R. B. no. 9.
'Mr. Edwin S. Smith, dissenting, said:
"I would permit the 'or by neither' place to continue on the ballot. I would provide,
however, that unless the ballots marked in this space constitute a majority of the
ballots cast they should be disregarded in tabulating the effective vote. Under
such an arrangement these ballots would merely have filled the role of indicating
to the Board that less than a majority of those voting do not desire to be represented by either labor organization. The wishes of this minority should then properly be held ineffective to prevent a choice of representation of one of the contending agencies."
See also in re American France Line, 3 N. L. R. B. no. 45; in re Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines. 3 N. L. R. B. no. 69: in re Ohio Foundry Co., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 71; in re
John Morrell and Co., 4 N. L. R. B. no. 59; in re Walker Vehicle Co., 4 N. L. R. B. no. 34.
In several cases, the "or by neither" phrase has obtained the largest number of votes.
See 'inre American France Line, 4 N. L. R. B. no. 75.
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come responsible for settling disputes within a labor organization such as
the American Federation of Labor. A number of cases have arisen involving
jurisdictional disputes, which more logically should be settled by the Federation itself. The Aluminum Company case 54 is an example. The problem
there was not whether the union should represent the employees, but rather,
who should represent the union in its dealings with the company. The
Board was satisfied that the union had been selected by a majority of the
employees, but it did not feel duty-bound to intervene and decide an issue
involving solely and in a peculiar fashion the internal affairs of the Federation and its chartered bodies. Such a matter, it felt, could best be decided
by the parties themselves. While in this case the dispute was between two
groups of officials in the same labor organization, the Board has assumed a
similar position of laissez-faire in disputes involving two or more unions
affiliated with the Federation whenever the existing labor organization possessed the authority to render a decision in the matter.55
(1)

Majority Rule

When representatives have been designated by the majority of employees
in a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining, it is the right
of these representatives to be treated as the exclusive bargaining agency for
all the employees in the unit. The right is reserved to the minority, however, to present their grievances to the employer. Despite the fact that "majority rule" has been adopted by every important board created for the
regulation of labor relations, 56 some discussion has centered about its desir7
ability.
Perhaps the most important justification for majority rule, in that it
establishes representatives who shall be the sole bargainers for the group,
"In re Aluminum Co. of America, 1 N. L. R. B. 537.
'In re The Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 604. See also in re Standard
Oil Co. of California, 1 N. L. R. B. 614, where the rule was followed even though several
of the unions involved had no membership among the employees in the alleged bargaining unit; and in re American Tobacco Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 198, where, after ordering
an election in a unit in which the machine adjusters were included, the Board amended
its direction of election to exclude those employees on a petition for intervention filed
by the International Association of Machinists subsequent to the direction of election.
'The following boards may be mentioned: The War Labor Board, Bridgeport Case,
Docket No. 132 (shop committees) ; but cf. Employees v. General Elec. Co., Docket No.
19; Railroad Labor Board, International Association of Machinists v. Atchison, T. &
S. F. Ry., Dec. No. 119, 2 R. R. L. Bd. 87 (1921) ; Brotherhood v. Pennsylvania System,
Dec. No. 220, 2 R. R. L. Bd. 216 (1921) ; The National Labor Board, in re Denver Tramway Corp.. 1 N. L. B. 64, March 1, 1934; in re Real Silk Co., N.R.A. Release No.
4647, April 27, 1934; Petroleum Labor Policy Board, in re Magnolia Petroleum Co.,
P. L. P. B. No. 2, at 2, Feb. 28, 1934 (82002) ; but cf. in re Texas Co. P. L. P. B.
No. 6, May 15, 1934 (85090). See WATKINS, LABOR PROBLEMS AND LABOR ADIINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE WORLD WAR (1919) 142 (Shipbuilding

Labor Adjustment Board).
'For the case against majority rule, see Sargent, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining under Section 7 (a) (1934) 29 ILL. L. Rzv. 275.
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is the fact that such rule is effective in preventing internecine competition.5
If several groups competed with the one designated by the majority, the
employer would be in a position to play the groups off against each other
and divide the strength of the unit. Thus, in the Sands Manufacturing
decision, 59 the employer had shut down his plant because of a dispute with
the union representing a majority of the employees. Later, after successful
negotiations with a union not representing a majority, he was able to reopen
the factory. The Board held that the employer was not justified in altering
the "status quo" without bargaining with the prior union as the exclusive
representative of the employees.
In light of the restrictions of the Act on employer activity in regard to
unions; company or otherwise, the employer will not be eager to press an
election even when a company union victory is likely; and if he takes the
initiative in recognizing a company union, he will almost certainly be found
guilty of interference. Majority rule thus insures against the employer's
breaking the power of a victorious union by favoring or dealing separately
with a company union. A union which loses an election, although handicapped by a loss of prestige, is allowed to continue its efforts. Majority
rule implies the ability to call an election at any time to test the strength
of the majority or to see whether there has been a change in the composition
of the majority. Thus there appears to be a danger of frequent elections,
especially where two unions are close contenders for majority representation.
Such rivalry will mean not only incessant union activity in the plant, a
source of annoyance to the employer, but, further, that the minority union
can frequently challenge the right of the other to represent the majority
by demanding that the Board hold elections. This would be unfair to the
employer and would weaken collective bargaining, in that the authority of
the representatives could be so constantly questioned.
There is a danger that majority rule will operate to preserve artificially
the balance of factional strength at the time of election. It -will be the problem of the Board to see that elections, when demanded, shall be held at intervals sufficiently short so that representatives will mirror larger-scale shifts of
loyalty. Any possible solution must take into consideration the fact that
the duration of collective agreements is definitely limited; and, according
to decisions of the Board, if employees in a unit vote to change their representatives during the duration of the contract, new representatives must
abide by the contract already negotiated. In view of these considerations,
it would seem desirable to hold elections at the close of the contract in order
'The Decisions of the National Labor Relations Board (1935) 48 HARV. L. REV.
629 at 638.
'In re Sands Manufacturing Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 546. See (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv.

1362.
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to attain greater stability in labor relations. Since grievances which may
arise are the only items not covered by the contract, and furthermore, since
minority groups can present their grievances to the employer, regardless of
the majority representatives, it would not seem worth while to change the
majority representatives during the running of the contract, since they could
do no more than the minority group, which might increase to a majority.
In its rulings on the "by the majority of the employees" clause, the Board
has had to decide on one of three possible interpretations. This was done
in the Radio Corporationcase, 60 where a boycott of the election for representatives was carried on by the Employee's Committee Union, one of the
two contestants for the bargaining privilege. The total number of employees
eligible to vote in the election was 9,752, while the total number of ballots cast
amounted to 3,163. Since there were so few participants, was the election
a valid one? The phrase, "majority of employees", could refer to an
affirmative majority of all employees eligible to vote.61 Or it could be interpreted as meaning a majority of those participating in the election, provided
the number of votes cast was a majority of those eligible to vote. Finally,
the phrase might be interpreted as referring to a majority of the eligible
employees voting in the election, so that the organization receiving a majority
of the votes cast is to be certified as the exclusive representative. The first
interpretation was rejected in Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation
No. 40,62 where the Court applied the second interpretation. In rulings following the Virginian Railway decision, 63 the Board has not required that an
organization receive a number of votes equal to a majority of the eligible
employees in order to be certified as the exclusive representative.
The
grounds for such an interpretation are that minority organizations, merely
by peacefully refraining from voting, can prevent certification of organizations which they cannot muster enough strength to defeat in an election. In
64
the Radio Corporation case, the Board adhered to the third interpretation.
C. The Appropriate Bargaining Unit
Majority rule presupposes the existence of a bargaining unit; and being
'In re R. C. A. Manufacturing Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 159 at 168.
'In all cases prior to July 1, 1936, where an election had been held, the Board required
that an organization to be certified must obtain a majority of the votes of those eligible
to vote. Thus in the case of in re Chrysler Corporation, 1 N. L. R. B. 164, where 700
1persons were eligible and only 125 ballots were cast, the Board refused to make any
certification.
"84 F. (2d) 641 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936).
'In re Associated Press, 1 N. L. R. B. 686; in re New England Transportation Co.,
1 N. L. R. B. 130: in re American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 424; in re
Consolidated Aircraft Corporation, 2 N. L. R. B. 774.
"This same interpretation has been applied in re American-Hawaiian Steamship Co.,
2. N. L. R. B. 195, where, although 55 employees were eligible to vote, only 19 ballots
were cast: in re Williams Dimond and Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 859; in re Charles Cushman
Shoe Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 1017.
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so predicated, it is evident that the effect of the rule depends upon the Board,
which is authorized to designate the unit. Because of the great variety
of cases which the Board must decide, it is impossible to obtain a clear conception of what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit. 65 The Act admits
the possible forms which the unit may assume; it may be the craft unit, plant
unit, or even some other unit.66 A unit is simply a particular group of
employees whose occupations and activities are so similar that it is logical,
practical, or customary to specify the terms of their employment-in a single
collective agreement.
Since its first rulings, the Board has consistently applied several principles
in determining the appropriate unit. One of these is the history of labor
relations in the industry itself and the established course of dealing between
6T
an employer and his employees. Thus in M. H. Birge and Sons Company,
the facts that for the last fourteen years the manufacturers in the industry
negotiated agreements with the union on behalf of color mixers, machine
printers, and print cutters, and the respondent had bargained collectively with
the union and its predecessors regarding the same workers, were held to be
controlling in determining the unit. 68 The Board has assumed that collective
bargaining is facilitated by adhering to the methods of the past, in the absence
of any indication that a change in those methods has become necessary.
Determining the appropriate unit by considering the methods which have
'See Second Annual Report of the Nqtional Labor Relations Board, 122-123 (1937).
Determination of a unit is required in two types of cases: petition for certification of
representatives, pursuant to section 9 (c) of the Act, and complaints charging that an
employer has refused to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
in violation of section 8 (5) of the Act. In both cases a determination of the appropriate
unit is indispensable to the decision; for a certification of representatives would be meaningless if there was no definition of the unit to be represented, and similarly, a complaint
alleging that an employer had refused to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees may be sustained only if those representatives were designated by
employees in a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining. See Little,
The Appropriate Unit for Collective Bargaining (1937) 12 Wis. L. REv. 367.
In the only case which was presented to both the Wagner Board and its successor,
contrary conclusions were reached as to the appropriate unit. Compare in re Gordon
Baking Co., 1 N. L.'R. B. (old) 102 with in re Gordon Baking Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 53.
'Section 9 (b) of the Act provides that: "The board shall decide in each case whether,
in order to insure to employees the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to
collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit,
plant unit, or subdivision thereof."
61 N. L. R. B. 731.
'See in re International Mercantile Marine Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 384; in re Bell Oil
and Gas Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 562: in re S. L. Allen and Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 714; in re
Swayne and Hoyt, Ltd., 2 N. L. R. B. 282: in re Remington Rand, Inc., 2 N. L. R. B.
626: in re Shell Oil Co. of California, 2 N. L. R. B. 835; in re R. C. A. Communications,
Inc., 2 N. L. R. B. 1109; in re Huth and James Shoe Manufacturing Co., 3 N. L. R. B.
no. 20.
In re Whittier Mills Co.. and in re Silver Lake Co., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 34, the Board
ruled that both plants of the respondent should be considered as one unit, because
previous negotiations had considered them so. See also in re Rossie Velvet Co., 3 N.
L. R. B. no. 82; in re Jones Lumber Co., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 89.
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been used successfully in the industry as a whole is illustrated by Portlandi
Gas and Coke Company, 9 in which a question arose as to whether the men
in a division of the company's plant, which was separated from the balance
of the plant by seven miles, should he included within a single unit with
the remaining employees. The Board, in its ruling, pointed out that it
should be included since it was not exceptional for labor organizations in
70
the industry to have members scattered over fifty miles.
Another tonsideration made by the Board. in determining the proper unit
is the past efforts of the employees to organize or their present self-organization. Thus in American Tobacco Company,71 the petitioning union argued
that the appropriate unit be limited to those employees actually engaged in
production. The company, on the other hand, maintained that employees in
collateral departments should also be included. The Board found in favor
of the smaller unit on the basis that the employees themselves organized their
union along lines which excluded from membership employees in the adjunct
departments. 72 When the employees in a smaller group have indicated a
desire not to be included with other employees in a single bargaining unit
as they did in Motor Transport Company,73 the Board has abided by their
wishes.
In a number of instances, the Board has determined that the rules of
eligibility to membership in the unions formed by the employees constitute
a clear manifestation of the manner in which they desire to bargain collectively.74 In two cases, Cushman Company75 and Interlake Iron Corporation,76 the qualifications for membership in the competing unions were the
same and the Board ruled on the basis of this fact in determining the appropriate unit. In Wilcox Manufacturing Company,7 7 the union's admission
to membership of certain temporary employees was a factor in the ruling
that the appropriate unit should not be restricted to permanent production
'2 N. L. R. B. 552. See also in re International Mercantile Marine Co., 1 N. L. R.
B. 384; in re Mosinee Paper Mills Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 393; in re M. H. Birge and Sons
Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 731; in re Swayne and Hoyt, Ltd., 2 N. L. R. B. 282; in re Motor
Transport Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 492; in re Williams Dimond and Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 1109.
"'Cf. in re Hoffman Beverage Co., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 64, where the Board held that
the distance between the two plants was too great to warrant their being included in
the same unit. See also in re Pennsylvania Salt Manufacturing Co., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 74.
72
N. L. R. B. 198.
'See in re Chrysler Corporation, 1 N. L. R. B. 164; in re Agwilines, Inc., 2 N. L. R.
B. 1; in re Crucible Steel Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 298; in re Oregon Worsted Co., 2 N. L. R.
B. 417; in re American Cyanamid and Chemical Corporation, 2 N. L. R. B. 881.
7'2N. L. R. B. 492. See also in re International Mercantile Marine Co., 1 N. L.
R. B. 384; in re R. C. A. Communications. Inc.; 2 N. L. R. B. 1109.
"'See it re Timken Silent Automatic Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 335; in re International
Filter Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 489; in re Agwilines, 2 N. L. R. B. 1.
72 N. L. R. B. 1015.
712N. L. R. B. 1036.
72 N. L.R. B. 97.
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employees, but should also include those of a temporary nature.78 It should
be emphasized, however, that while this is a principle applied by the Board
to determine the appropriate bargaining unit, the eligibility of some of the
employees involved to membership in a union is not necessarily a bar to
their inclusion in a unit found appropriate by the Board. 79 In other cases,
the Board has ruled that the appropriate unit be limited to a group smaller
than the eligible membership of the unions concerned. In Merchants and
Miners Transportation Co.mpany,s0 the issue was whether the units for
licensed deck officers and licensed engineers should include certain lower
rank employees who were not required to be licensed, but who, in fact,
held licenses entitling them to positions of high rank. All three of the
participating unions admitted these employees to membership and contended
that they should be part of the appropriate unit. The Board, however,
adopted the company's contention and excluded those employees, saying that
in view of other circumstances the mere condition of eligibility, standing
alone, did not warrant their inclusion. 8 '
A further consideration of the Board in determining the appropriate
unit is that of the existence or lack of existence of a mutual interest among
the employees concerned. This is based upon the obvious principle that
mutual interest among the employees is likely to further harmonious organization and make for more effective bargaining. Accordingly, in Canton
Enameling and Stamping Company,8 2 the Board found that the machinists,
who do work of a highly skilled nature and receive wages substantially
greater than those received by the employees of the production departments,
should constitute a separate unit, because of these differences between themselves and their fellow workers.83
Among the specific circumstances which make for a community of interest
is the nature of the work.

In Agwilines, Inc.,8 4 for the convenience of the

industry, the longshoremen and dock workers were divided into two classifica'See in re Acklin Stamping Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 872; in re Huth and James Manufactur-

ing Co., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 20: in re The B. F. Goodrich Co. 3 N. L. R. B. no. 40; in re
Mergenthaler Linotype Co., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 51.
'For rulings of a similar nature see, in re Luckenbach Steamship Co., 2 N. L. R. B.
181: in re Grace Lines, Inc., 2 N. L. R. B. 369; in re New York and Cuba Mail Steanship Co.. 2 N. L. R. B. 595.
w2 N. L. R. B. 747.
mSee in re Bendix Products Corporation, 3 N. L. R. B. no. 68.
81 N. L. R. B. 402.
'For rulings concerning machinists, apprentices, and helpers, see in re Duplex Printing Press Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 82; it re New England Transportation Co., 1 N. L. R. B.
130; it re International Filter Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 489. For rulings concerning ship
carpenters, caulkers, and joiners, see in re Harbor Boatbuilding Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 349;
concerning printing pressmen and assistants, see, in re Edward E. Cox, Printer, Inc., 1
N. L. R. B. 594; blank cutters, in re Pioneer Pearl Button Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 837;
licensed deck officers and engineers, in re Black Diamond Steamship Corporation, 2
N. L. R. B. 241: and in re International Mercantile Marine Co.. 1 N. L. R. B. 384.
&12 N. L. R. B. 1.
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tions; but the Board held that since the workingmen were frequently interchanged and were paid on the same hourly basis, they had a common interest.
Thus in a number of decisions the Board has held that production workers
should be considered a unit separate from the clerical and supervisory staff,8 5
and those who perform essentially different tasks are ordinarily considered
as a separate bargaining unit.8 6
Another consideration in determining whether a community of interests
8
exists is the skill of the workers. In Chrysler Corporation,
7 the designing
engineers employed by the company could be classified in three groups,
chassis, body, and tool and dye engineers. Each in turn had certain subclasses, the members of which had special aptitudes and experience. The
Board held that all the designing engineers engaged by the company constituted an appropriate unit; for practically all the men had received professional training in technical schools or colleges and were fitted by training
and experience to work in more than one subclassification. Hence the group
was distinguished from clerical and'production workers in function and train88
ing and also from electrical and chemical engineers.
Either a common wage rate or a similar method of payment may identify
a class of employees with a community of interest sufficient to place them
in the same bargaining unit. This factor, however, may do no more than
point out the difference otherwise existing between two groups of employees
'See, in re R. C. A. Manufacturing Co. Inc., 2 N. L. R. B. 159; in re United States
Stamping Co.. 1 N. L. R. B. 123; in re The American Tobacco Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 198;
in re Crucible Steel Co. of America, 2 N. L. R. B. 298; in re Motor Transport Co., 2
N. L. R. B. 492; in re Remington Rand, Inc., 2 N. L. R. B. 626; in re Consolidated
Aircraft Corporation, 2 N. L. R. B. 772; in re R. C. A. Communications, Inc., 2 N. L. R.
B. 1109: in re Industrial Rayon Corporation, 3 N. L. R. B. no. 2; in re Atlas Mills, Inc.,
3 N. L. R. B. no. 3: in re Hunter Packing Co., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 10; in re Mergenthaler
Linotype Co.. 3 N. L. R. B. no. 13; in re Suburban Lumber Co., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 17;
in re Northrop Corporation, 3 N. L. R. B. no. 19a; in re Central Truck Lines, Inc., 3
N. L. R. B. no. 26: in re Lane Cotton Mills Co., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 31; in re United
States Coal and Coke Co., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 37; in re The Boss Manufacturing Co., 3
N. L. R. B. no. 39: in re Georgia Duck and Cordage Mill, 3 N. L. R. B. no. 42; in re
National Electric Products Corporation, 3 N. L. R. B. no. 47; in re John Morrel and
Co.,6 3 N. L. R. B. no. 84.
" See in re St. Joseph Stock Yards Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 39; in. re Consumers' Research,
Inc.. 2 N. L. R. B. 57: in re American Tobacco Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 198; in re R. C. A.
Manufacturing Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 159; in re Carlisle Lumber Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 248;
in re Crucible Steel Co. of America, 2 N. L. R. B. 298; in, re Bendix Products Corporation, 3 N. L. R. B. no. 68; in re Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 3 N. L. R. B. no. 69;
in re Commonwealth Division of General Steel Castings Corporation, 3 N. L. R. B. no.
78: in re Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. of California, 3 N. L. R. B. no. 81.
Mutual interest occurs when there is a large degree of interchangeability among the

members of the groups. In re Portland Gas and Coke Co., 72 N. L. R. B. 552, although
the operating department of the company was divided into four bureaus each performing somewhat dissimilar functions, frequent interchangeability of workers made
the entire operating department constitute a single appropriate unit. See also, in re
Agwilines, Inc., 2 N. L. R. B. 1; in re Luckenbach Steamship Co., Inc., 2 N. L. R. B.
181; and in re Globe Mail Service, Inc., 2 N. L. R. B. 610.
1 N. L. R. B. 164.
'For cases see note 83 supra.
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of the same employer. Employees paid on an hourly basis, for example, may
be production workers, while those paid weekly are clerical employees.8 9
In a number of cases, the Board has not determined the unit. The fact
that all of the parties to a proceeding are agreed as to the extent of the unit
has usually been treated by the Board as decisive and conclusive.90 Exceptions have been made, however, for the absence of contention over the appropriate unit does not necessarily require the Board to accept unquestioningly
the unit assumed by the parties to be appropriate. 91
More recently, the Board has been following a principle which was foreshadowed in a decision of the National Labor Board, that of allowing the
employees to determine the unit themselves. 92 Thus in Cornnwnwealth Division of General Steel Castings Corporations,93 the Board, in its decision,
made no final determination as to the appropriate unit. One of the contesting
unions claimed that all the employees engaged in production and maintenance, exclusive of supervisory employees, constituted a single appropriate
unit. Federation unions contended that the company's welders and acetylene
cutters, together with other workers of a more skilled nature, should constitute separate units. The Board, in its ruling, stated that since the contention
of either union could be sustained, it would direct that separate elections
be held for the described groups which would decide the issue on the basis
'In" re Canton Enameling and Stamping Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 402; in re Westinghouse
Electric and Manufacturing Co., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 1; in re McCabe, Hamilton, and Renny,
Ltd., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 53, (determination of regular and casual labor by the wage
rate); in re West Virginia Pulp and Paper Co., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 67; in re Pennsylvania Salt Manufacturing Co., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 74.
'This agreement may appear: (1) as a stipulation entered into between the parties.
See in re American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 424; in re Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 767; in re Todd Seattle Dry Docks, Inc., 2 N. L. R. B.
1070: (2) or in the pleadings and testimony given at the hearing, see, in re Lykes
Brothers Steamship Co., Inc., 2 N. L. R. B. 102; in re Samson Tire and Rubber Corporation, 2 N. L. R. B. 148; in re Shell Oil Co. of California, 2 N. L. R. B. 835; in re
American Cyanamid and Chemical Corporation, 2 N. L. R. B. 881; in re International
Mercantile Marine Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 971: i, re Cambell Machine Co., 3 N. L. R. B. no.
79; in re Star and Crescent Oil Co., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 93; in re Hat Corporation of
America, 3 N. L. R. B. no. 99.
See in re Stone Knittinz Mills Co., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 22, wherein the Board held that
the unit agreed upon by both contestant unions was appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining. See also in re Lane Cotton Mills Co., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 31. In re
The B. F. Goodrich Co.. 3 N. L. R. B. no. 40a, the contestant unions were agreed except
in a few particulars as to the appropriate unit. The Board decided the unit for 12
laboratory workers.
'In re Richards-Wilcox Manufacturing Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 97, a proceeding concerning
representation in which only one union was involved and in which the company itself did
not participate, the Board refused to limit the appropriate bargaining unit to the company's permanent production workers, as the union desired; but extended it to include
the temporary production workers because of the substantial similarity of their interests. See also, in re International Freighting Corporation, et al., 3 N. L. R. B.
no. 70. In re American France Line. et al., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 7. the Board decided upon
a unit other than that favored by both contestant unions. The companies wished the
Board to decide the controversy.
'See in re Budd Manufacturing Co.. 1 N. L. R. B. 58, 61.
*4 N. L. R. B. no. 22.
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of the preference indicated by the employees in the elections. Similar rulings
were made in the Globe Machine and Stamping Compan P4 and the Shell
Company decisions, 95 where the Board found that the considerations as to
the units or unit to which the craft groups should belong were sufficiently
balanced so that the determining factor should be the desires of the men
themselves.9 6
Thus in granting workers the right to vote in order to determine whether
they desire to continue under the craft form of organization, and since
the history of past attempts at negotiations, previous experience in collective
bargaining, and the community of interests through skill, wages and training
all point in favor of the craft method of unionization, it appears that the
craft method is assured of more than a fair deal at the hands of the National
Labor Relations Board. If the craft unit is active enough to retain the
loyalty of its members, it is given the assurance of continued existence under
97
the Act.
D. Unfair Labor Practices

(1) Domination and Interference With the Formationand Administrationof a
Labor Organizationand Contribution of Financialor Other Support to It 9"
The so-called "company union" came into its own under the National
83

N. L. R. B. no. 25.

'"4 N. L. R. B. no. 36b.
"See in re City Auto Stamping Co., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 24; in re The Globe Machine
and Siamping Co., 3 N. L. R. B. no. 25; in re Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines et al., 4 N.
L. R. B. no. 37; in re Commonwealth Division of General Steel Castings Corporation,
3 N. L. R. B. no. 78: in re Pacific Gas and Electric Co.. 3 N. L. R. B. no. 87; in re
Worthington Pump and Machinery Corporation, 4 N. L. R. B. no. 61.
'Cases in which the American Federation of Labor and the Committee for Industrial
Organization have been contestants, and have been decided in favor of the former on the
basis of: (1) history of labor organization, include, in re The H. Neuer Glass Co., 4 N.
L. R. B. no. 14: in re The Texas Co., 4 N. L. R. B. no. 27; in re Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Qo., 4 N. L. R. B. no. 24; (2) skill, in re Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. 4 N. L.
R. B. no. 30: in re Friedman Blau Farber Co., 4 N. L. R. B. no. 23; (3) wages, in re
The H. Neuer Glass Co., 4 N. L. R. B. no. 14.
The C. I. 0. position was upheld in re Scottdale Mills, 4 N. L. R. B. no. 1, in which
the Board held that the production and maintenance employees constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining. In re Chicopee Manufacturing Corporation, 4 N. L. R. B. no. 62, during the hearing the American Federation of Textile
Operatives indicated willingness, in the event that it should be chosen as the bargaining
representetive of the company's employees, to amend its charter so as to render eligible
for membership all employees of the company except clerks and supervisors. The Board
held that no adequate evidence was introduced to show that the loom fixers should constitute a separate bargaining unit. For a discussion of the Board's position, see The
Nctional Labor Relations Board faces A. F. of L.-C. L 0. R ivalry (1937) 6 INTERNATL. JuR DIcAL Ass'N. BULL. 41.
'Sections of the Act relevant to this unfair labor practice include section 8 (2), which
declares that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute
financial or other support to it", and section 7 which guarantees to employees "the right
to self-organization" and "to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing."
The term "labor organization" means "any organization of any kind, or agency
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Industrial Recovery Act. It is estimated that approximately 707o of the
9
company unions now in existence came after the passage of the Act.Y
Nothing in the National Labor Relations Act prohibits the formation of a
company union if such an organization of workers is confined by its own
volition to the boundaries of a particular plant or employer. The Act seeks
to make such an organization the free choice of the employees, and not a
choice dictated by forms of interference which are weighty because of the
existence of the employer-employee relationship. 100
To dominate unions, violators of the Act have resorted to a number of
techniques. Often the labor organizations are openly espoused by the employer, the mechanics of the plan's functioning leaving no doubt of its subserviency to the employer's will."0 ' In the formation of the organizations,
the employer may help draft the constitution and by-laws.' 0 2 Employees
are urged and sometimes coerced to join the association. 10 3 Officers of
the employer attend and address meetings, and officers of the dominated
union may carry on the work of the organization on the company's time. 10 4
Clerical expenses are met by the company. The inadequacy of representation
is revealed by the paucity of successful agreements concerning wages and
hours, although accord may be reached over such topics as picnics, bowling,
ventilation, and general improvement of working conditions. 0 5
or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."
Whether the labor organization is an employee representation plan,
(.Section 2 (5))
good will club, friendship association, department council, or back-to-work association,
if it has for a purpose to deal with the employer in the matters specified above, it is a
labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
'See Extent and Characteristics of Company Unions (Preliminary Report) (1935)
41 MoN. LAoR REv. 1; Garrison, The National Labor Relations Act, (1935) 24 Sui.
G. 596 at 598..
'Thus
the employer can continue his contributions to the pension fund and other
welfare activities if both he and the workers so desire. Such contributions are valid
so long as they do not influence bargaining relations between employer and employees.
It is of interest to note that some company unions have revised their charters to
extend their activities to include the function of collective bargaining. In re S. Blechman
and Sons, Inc., 4 N.L.R.B. no. 3, the company union so adjusted its charter to allow
collective bargaining activities. It is clear that the Association never filled this function, for Art. V, sec. 5, of the Association's charter provides that "all voting shall be
strictly by open ballot." It was found further that supervisory and influential employees
succeeded in monopolizing the offices and perverted its functions to fit the labor policies
of the respondent.
"'See in re International Harvester Company, 2 N.L.R.B. 310, wherein the employer
introduced a council plan in 1919 which was adopted in 25 of the respondent's plants.
See also in re Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 1; in re Western Union
Telegraph Co., 3 N.L.R.B. no. 32; in re Bemis Brothers Bag Co., 3 N.L.R.B. no. 23.
"In re Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 431.
"'li re Carlisle Lumber Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 248; in re National Electric Products Corporation, 3 N.L.R.B. no. 47.
"'In re Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 431; in re Highway Trailer Co.,
3 N.L.R.B. no. 65.
"See i re International Harvester Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 310. For a discussion of this
decision, see Second Annual Report of The National Labor Relations Board, 95ff (1937).
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A labor organization, although not organized by the employer nor assisted
by him in any way, may be contrary to the intent of the Act. In Regal Shirt
06
Corpany,1
the mayor and influential local citizens addressed the employees
and sought to dissuade them from joining the union, declaring that if the
employees joined, the factory would move out of town. Hence an Association was formed, the creature of the mayor's efforts to keep the factory in
town. The Board, in holding that the Association was in violation of the
Act, took the same position it assumed in Ansin Shoe Company'0 7 when it
ruled that the "organization had sprung up in response to the employer",
although he had not aided nor sponsored it.
(2) Encouragement or Discouragement of Membership in a Labor Organiaation by Discrimization0 8
The most clear-cut violation of this section is the open discharge of certain
employees for participating in union activities. 0 9 In most cases of alleged
10 4 N.L.R.B. no. 74.

'1I N.L.R.B. 929. The Board said:
"We do not so narrowly interpret section 8 (2) as to require this direct and
immediate link between the employer and the outlawed organization. This section
does not stand alone; its meaning is derived not solely from its words but from
related sections and from the purposes of the act. This section makes specific one
of the ways in which an employer can interfere with the broad right of the employees
under section 7 to bargain collectively through representatives of 'their own
choosing' and is to be construed so as to further the intention of section 7. Its
object is to protect the rights of employees from being hamstrung by an organization which has grown up in response to the will and the purposes of the employer,
an organization which would not be in the sense of section 7 an organization
of the employees' choice. The workers may be aware of their employer's
antipathy to union organization and seek to propitiate him by acceptable
conduct. This may be unavoidable. But the employer can be prevented from
engaging in overt activity calculated to produce that result. If labor organizations
are to be truly representative of the employee's interest, as was the intention
of Congress as embodied in this Act, the words 'dominate and interfere with the
formation of any labor organization' must be broadly interpreted to cover any
conduct upon the part of an employer which is intended to bring into being, even
indirectly, some organization which he considers favorable to his interests."
See also in re Hill Bus Company, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 781. See in re Oregon Worsted
Co., 3 N.L.R.B. no. 5 wherein the Board criticises a State Board of Conciliation for
exerting
pressure upon striking employees to secure a settlement.
' 0Section 8 (3) of the Act provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer:
"By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization: Provided: That nothing in this act, or in the National Industrial
Recovery Act (U.S.C., Supp. VII, title 15, secs. 701-712), as amended from time
to time, or in any code or agreement approved or prescribed thereunder, or in any
other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an
agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained or assisted by
any action defined in this act as an unfair labor practice) to require as a cofidition
of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative
of the employees as provided in section 9 (a) in the appropriate collective-bargaining
unit covered by such agreement when made."
' 6In no case has a respondent admitted in its pleadings or at the hearing that it has
discriminated against employees because of their union activity. Evidence has gone
uncontradicted. See in re Fruehauf Trailer Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 68; in re Timken Silent

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
discriminatory discharge, the employer has contended that the dismissals
had nothing to do with organizational activity, but were caused by inefficiency,
insubordination, infraction of rules, or some other legitimate cause. 1 0 In
evaluating the assertions of employers who discharge workers for inefficiency
rather than for union activities, the Board has considered such factors as
length of total employment, experience in the particular position from which
the employee was discharged, efficiency ratings, the testimony of foremen or
other employees- associated with the worker in question, and the treatment
given to other employees of apparently equal or less efficiency."-' Long
service does not connote the efficiency of the employee; it does indicate,
however, that the employer has not considered his possible inefficiency of
itself serious enough to merit discharge. Similarly, the fact that employees
were retained who had committed errors as serious as those advanced as
reasons for the discharge does not imply that discharge for such an error
would not have been justified. It indicates only that error may not have been
the motivating cause in the severance of employment. Hence in Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,- 2 the respondent claimed that the discharge of the
driver was due to an accident amounting to fifty dollars damages. Evidence
disclosed, however, that the bus driver, an active and important union organizer, had been previously rewarded for his exceptional record as a driver
and had received a bonus for having completed a year of driving without
accident. It was further disclosed that it was not the policy of the respondent
to discharge men for an accident of such a nature unless their previous record
was a poor one. In light of this evidence, the Board doubted the sincerity
Automatic Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 335; in re Fashion Piece Dye Works, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 285;
in re J. Freezer and Son, Inc., 3 N.L.R.B. no. 12; in re Clover Fork Coal Co., 4
N.L.R.B. no. 33.
For cases of discharge of employees shortly after election to union offices, see in re
Agwilines, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 1; in re Crucible Steel Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 298; in re Houston
Cartage Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 1000..
21'See in re Houston Cartage Co., Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 1000; in re Agwilines, Inc., 2
N.L.R.B. 1 (charge of inefficiency); in re National New York Packing and Shipping
Co., Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 1009 (insubordination). See also in re Martin Dyeing and Finishing Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 403; in re Herbert Robinson and Otto A. Gulluber, co-partners,
2 N.L.R.B. 460; in re Wallace Manufacturing Co., Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 1081; in re Botany
Worsted Mills, 4 N.L.R.B. no. 43.
'nTo determine the validity of a respondent's contentions, the Board has consistently
followed the rule established in its first decision when it stated, "in reaching a decision
between these conflicting contentions the Board has had to take into consideration
the entire background of the discharges, the inferences to be drawn from testimony
'and conduct, and the soundness of the contentions when tested against such background
and inferences." [Cf. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1930)] As the Supreme
Court has said, "motive is a persuasive interpreter of equivocal conduct." Cf. Texas and
New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Railroad and Steamship Clerks, 281
U. S. 548 (1930).
See in re General Industries Co., 1 N.L.R.B.- 1009, wherein the insubordination of
a union employee was found to have been a pretext rather than the motivating cause
of his discharge. See also in re Thompson Products, Inc., 3 N.L.R.B. no. 97.
n'2 N.L.R.B. 431.
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and validity of the reason advanced by the respondent for discharging the
driver.'"
The Board has ruled that an employee need not be a member of a union
nor actively engaged in union activities for his discharge to constitute a
violation of this part of the Act. What mAst be proved is that the discharge has the effect of discouraging union membership. In Quidnick Dye
Works,"14 it was found that the discharge of an employee who was not engaged in union activities was discriminatory, when the reason advanced was
the discharge on the preceding day of his brother who was an active union
member. 1 5
The phrase, "discrimination in regard to hire and tenure of employment",
may apply to cases not only of outright discharge but also of demotions,
temporary lay-offs, or furloughs, when discriminatorily applied."" In the
Hardwick Stove Cwnpany case, 117 the Board held that in an atmosphere
charged with coercion and intimidation, the demotion of two expert molders,
who had been seen by the respondent attending union meetings, to more
menial and irregular jobs, constituted a discrimination in regard to conditions
of employment."18
A refusal to reinstate employees because of union affiliations or activities
has been held a violation, even though the original severance of employment
may have been entirely proper, either in the case of a shut-down for lack
of business or because of a strike. 119 Ordinarily a refusal to reinstate has
"The Board made a similar finding as to the discharge of another operator, who was
an active union member with an excellent record as a driver, where the defense given by
the respondent was "a failure to properly perform driving duties." See in re Harry G.
Beck, Trading as Rocks Express Co., 3 N.L.R.B. no. 11.
"'2 N.L.R.B. 963.
'See in re Bemis Brothers Bag Company, 3 N.L.R.B. no. 23.
'In re Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 1 at 36, the Board said:
"If the motivating cause of the discriminatory change in the tenure of employment was interfereice with the employees in the exercise of their guaranteed
rights or discouragement of membership in a labor organization, a violation is
established whether the change is temporary or permanent."
See in re Somerville Manufacturing Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 864; in re Maryland Distillery,
Inc., et al., 3 N.L.R.B. no. 16.
'n2 N.L.R.B. 78.

'Cf. in re Wallace Manufacturing Co., Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 1081, wherein the demotion
of the president of a union was followed by his discharge and retention of non-union
employees of lesser seniority. In re Greensboro Lumber Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 629, the respondent company shut down its mill two days after the union had sought to bargain collectively, on the ground that there were few orders and no lumber readily available
to fill them. This was not considered a lock-out by the Board. The later employment
of inexperienced non-union stackers while the union stackers previously employed were
idle, however, was held to be an act of discrimination discouraging to union membership.
'See n re Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 201; in re Segall Maigen,
Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 749; in re Mooresville Cotton Mills, 1 N.L.R.B. 950,
The Board has held it immaterial in such cases whether or not the individuals discriminated against retained their status as employees of the respondent at the time
they were refused reemployment. See in re Algonquin Printing Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 264,
wherein the employer, having refused reinstatement to two union members after a tem-
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not been found a violation in such cases unless the employees have applied
for reinstatement either in person or through their representatives' 20 and
have been refused. 121 Where employers themselves have taken the initiative
in recalling employees and it has been understood that only those.so notified
would be reemployed, application for reinstatement by the employees themselves has not been required. 2 2 Where the original severance of employment was itself an unfair labor practice, the Board has held that the employer
was under a duty to offer reinstatement to his employees and their failure
to apply for it was immaterial. 12
An offer of reemployment, conditioned upon the "abandonment of union
activities by the employee has been found to be equivalent to a refusal to
reinstate.124 As decided in Sunshine Hosiery Mills,'1 25 rejection of an offer
of immediate reemployment by employees while out on strike did not prevent
a ruling that a later refusal to reinstate them was a violation of section
8 (3) .126 Rejection of such an offer at the close of a strike, however, merely
because the wages offered were too low, has been held to preclude a finding
that the employer had in that instance been guilty of a discriminatory refusal
to reinstate.127 In Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company,1 28 the respondent,
porary shut-down of his plant, argued that since they had ceased to be his employees
within the meaning of the Act, a refusal to reemploy them could not be an unfair labor
practice. The Board rejected the argument in ruling, "Section 8 (3), in forbidding
discrimination in employment, is not limited to those who are employees at the time
of the discrimination. It forbids discrimination in regard 'to hire' generally. The purpose of the provision, is, it is true, to protect employees in their right to self-organization.
But'surely a refusal by an employer to rehire a former employee because of his union
activities which are well known to his former fellow workers discourages the latter
and so restrains them in the exercise of their right to self-organization." For a similar
ruling see, in re Radiant Mills, 1 N.L.R,B. 274; in re Bell Oil & Gas Co., 1 N.L.R.B.
562; in re Kentucky Firebrick Co., 3 N.L.R.B. no. 46.
"See in re United Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation, 1 N.L.R.B. 236; in re The
Sands Manufacturing Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 546; in re Somerville Manufacturing Co., 1
N.L.R.B. 864; it&re Alabama Mills, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 20; in re Elbe File and Binder Co.,
Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 906; in re Mooresville Cotton Mills, 2 N.L.R.B. 952.
'See ins re Timken Silent Automatic Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 335; in&re Jeffrey-DeWitt Insulator Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 618; in re Alabama Mills, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 20; in re Wald Transfer
and Storage Co., Inc., 3 N.L.R.B. no. 72; in re Stylecraft Leather Goods Co., Inc.,
3 N.L.R.B. no. 102.
'-See in re United Aircraft Manufacfuring Corporation, 1 N.L.R.B. 236; in re Atlanta
Woolen Mills, 1 N.L.R.B. 316; in re Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., Inc., 1
N.L.R.B. 411; in re Columbia Radiator Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 847.
=See in; re Washington, Virginia, and Maryland Coach Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 769; in re
Smith' Cabinet Manufacturing Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 950; in re Club Troika, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B.
90; in re Remington Rand, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 626; in re Lion Shoe Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 819.
='See in re Somerville Manufacturing Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 864; in re Alabama Mills, Inc.,
2 N.L.R.B. 20; in re Carlisle Lumber Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 248 (yellow-dog contract);
in; re Clarke and Reid Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 516 (requiring employees to give up their
membership in an outside union).
1 1 N.L.R.B. 664.
2-See also in re Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 125; in re Mooresville
Cotton Mills, 2 N.L.R.B. 952.
'"See h; re Pioneer Pearl Button Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 837. The holding does not imply
that a later refusal of the employer to reinstate these employees, if discriminatory and
discouraging to union membership, might not be found to be a violation of section 8 (3).
=1 N.L.R.B. 201.
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who had blacklisted certain employees and made it clear that they would not
be reemployed, caused them to delay their requests for reemployment until
their positions had been filled by other men, and then contended that its
refusal to reemploy them was not based upon their union record but simply
because there were no vacancies. The Board held that as the blacklist was
based upon the union activities of the employees and was the direct cause
of their delayed application, the employer's action was equivalent to a discriminatory refusal to reinstate. Similarly, contracting out work to another
concern in order to avoid reemploying workers locked out because of union
1 29
activities was held a violation of the Act.

Violations also occur when the employer has discriminated by ordering
the foremen to prefer members of a company-dominated union to members
of an outside union, by demoting a foreman for giving an outside union
man a good job, and by paying higher wages to company union members than
to outside union members for equivalent work. 3 0 Likewise, the conditioning
of reemployment after a strike upon membership in a company-dominated
union is contrary to the Act. 1 1 Also prohibited is the conduct of the employer in announcing a "yellow-dog" policy not to hire any of his employees
who have been striking unless they renounced all their affiliations with labor
organizations. Likewise soliciting and requiring employees to sign applications for work whereby they agreed to renounce all affiliation with labor
organizartions, constitutes a discrimination against these employees with
32
regard to terms or conditions of employment.
Section 8 (3) allows employees to require membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment if that labor organization represents the
employees in the established collective bargaining unit.1 33

This provision,

however, has the qualification that the labor organization must not have
been established, maintained, or assisted by any procedure defined in the
Act as an unfair labor practice. Thus in Clilnton Cottont Mills,'3 4 the respondent, having shut down its plant, concluded a closed-shop contract with
the "Clinton Friendship Association," a labor organization controlled by the

'See in re Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 454.
'See

in re Ag-wilines, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 1; in re Wheeling Steel Corporation, 1

N.L.R.B. 699; in re Hardwick Stove Company, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 78.

'See in re Clinton Mills, 1 N.L.R.B. 97; in re Hill Bus Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 781; in re
Lion Shoe Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 819.
'See in re Carlisle Lumber Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 248. See also in re Atlas Bag and
Burlap Co., Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 292, wherein the Board held that the action of the respondent in forcing certain employees to sign individual contracts of employment which
deprived them of the right to strike, demand union recognition, or question discharges,
discriminated against these employees in regard to terms or conditions of employment.
A similar ruling was made in re Tidewater Express Lines, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 560; in re
Alabama Mills, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 20; in re Clark and Reid, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 516.
.See note 108, supra.
ml N.L.R.B. 97.
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respondent employer. On the reopening of the mill, the respondent posted
a notice stating that pursuant to this contract only members of the Clinton
Friendship Association would henceforth be employed. To justify the refusal of employment to the ninety-six employees who did not join the Association, the respondent contended that since a closed-shop contract was
permitted by the provision, its conduct did not constitute discrimination
within the meaning of the Act. The Board ruled that as the Association
had been established by acts defined as unfair labor practices in section 8 (2),
it came within the qualification of the provision. 135
It might be added that the Act does not legalize the closed shop agreement
in the states where it has been declared illegal. Furthermore, nothing in
the Act declares that the employer must consent to the closed-shop when
demanded by the union.
(3) Interference, Restraint, and Coercion in the Exercise of the Rights Guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act'3 6
The most complete description of the violations of this part of the Act
have been set forth by the Board in the Remington-Rand decision wherein
the "Mohawk Valley Formula" was discussedJ 37 The plan, or formula,
consists of the employer's resorting to all sorts of propaganda to discredit
union leaders, the securing of unnecessary police protection when a strike
is called, the calling of a "mass meeting" of the citizens to coordinate public
sentiment against the strike, the formation of a large police force to intimidate the strikers and to exert a psychological effect upon the citizens, and
the sponsoring of "back-to-work" movements by "loyal employees". In
declaring these activities a violation of section 8 (1) of the Act, the Board
has held that the employer was utilizing these tactics to end the strike by
breaking it, rather than by settling it through the processes of collective
38
bargaining.
In other cases, the Board has declared all kinds of spying an interference
with the Act, whether it be done by officials of the company or by regular
.employees themselves, or outside hirelings. 39 The Board has also found
' The Board similarly condemned closed-shop contracts executed with companydominated unions in re Hill Bus Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 781; in re Lion Shoe Co., 2 N.L.R.B.
819; in re Southern Chemical Co., 3 N.L.R.B. no. 90.
'Sections of the Act which concern this unfair labor practice are: section 7, "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection"; section 8 (1) makes it an unfair labor practice for the employer
to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 7."
"In re Remington Rand, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 626.
'See Second Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, 61 (1937).
""See in re Washington, Virginia, and Maryland Coach Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 769; in re
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a violation of section 8 (1) in employer interference with self-organization
through disseminating propaganda against unions, thereby not only p'rejudicing the minds of workers against them, but also indicating that the employer
is antagonistic to unions.140 Most of this propaganda is aimed at the worker's
fear of loss of his job.
Another device is the threat to close or move the plant if the unions
succeed in organizing the employees. This has proved highly effective in
the more mobile industries in which the movement by employers to areas
where labor is unorganized and ready to accept low wages is well-known, as
in the clothing and shoe industries.' 4 '
Frequently, the employer seeks to discredit the union and bring it into
142
disrepute, by denouncing it as a "racket" or the organizers as "racketeers".
Charges of "Communism" are not unusual. 143 Anti-union statements have
taken the form of threats to discharge union members."4 In other instances,
1 45
workers have been threatened with blacklist and disrepute.
Another method of intimidation and coercion of the individual employees
may be found in cases where the employer has called in individual employees
one by one and asked them bluntly if they belonged to a union. 146 The
refusal of employers to deal with representatives who are not in their employ,
thus discouraging affiliation with an outside union, is a frequently used
technique.1

47

Confronted with the possibility of dealing with unions which may be
affiliated either with the American Federation of Labor or the Committee
for Industrial Organization, employees have preferred, in several cases, to
deal with the milder Federation unions rather than with the more belligerent
148
C.I.O. Accordingly, in the Friedman Blau Farber Company decision,
Agwilines, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 1; in re Hardwick Stove Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 78; in re Millfay
Manufacturing Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 919.
"4°See in re Remington Rand, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 626.
' 1See in re Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 432; in re S and K
Knee Pants Co., Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 940; in re Quidnick Dye Works, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 963.
"-'In re Atlas Bag and Burlap Co., Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 292; in re Jones and Laughlin
Steel Corporation, 1 N.L.R.B. 503; in re Wheeling Steel Corporation, 1 N.L.R.B. 699.
See First Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, 74-75 (1936).
"'In re Radiant Mills Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 274.
'"In re Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 431.
"'See In re Renown Stove Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 117; in re Elbe File and Binder Co.,
Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 626; in re Harrisburg Children's Dress Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 1058.
" 6See in re Greensboro Lumber Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 629; in re Hardwick Stove Co., Inc.,
2 N.L.R.B. 78; in re D. and H. Motor Freight Cq., 2 N.L.R.B. 231; in re Pacific
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B., 431; in re Herbert Robinson and Otto A. Golluber,
2 N.L.R.B. 460; in re Clark and Reid Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 516; in re William Randolph
Hearst, et al., 2 N.L.R.B. 530; in re Quidnick Dye Works, 2 N.L.R.B. 963; if re
Harrisburg Children's Dress Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 1058.
" The Board has ruled that this is a violation of sections 8 (1) and 8 (5) of the
Act. See in re Oregon Worsted Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 916; in re Wallace Manufacturing
Co., Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 1081.
"'4 N.L.R.B. no. 23. See also in re Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc.,
et al., 4 N.L.R.B. no. 10.
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the Board found that the respondent company opened its plant freely to
Federation organizers, allowing them to sign members during working hours.
The company itself went so far as to threaten its employees with discharge
if they did not join, and entered into a contract with the union, presumably
assuring itself that it would not now have to deal with an embryonic C.I.O.
union which was seeking to organize the plant. The C.I.O. union asked
the Board for an election. The A. F. of L., however, contended that the
contract entered into with the company barred an election. The Board found
that the interference, intimidation, and coercion on the part of the company
substantially negatived the contention of the A. F. of L. that it had been
freely designated as representative by a majority of the employees at the
time of the contract. Hence the Board ordered an election. 149

III. THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND A FUTURE LABOR POLICY

It has been urged that the present Act should be extended to restrain
labor unions in their undesirable activities just as the employers are curbed
at present. Whatever proposals are offered to regulate the activities of
trade unions, it must be remembered that the purpose of the Act is to redress
an existing unbalance between employer and employees. Any changes in
the Act which would hamper unions might serve to restore this unbalance
and defeat the original purpose of the Act. There seem to be adequate
restrictions on labor unions at present. The strike for a closed shop is illegal
in a majority of states. 150 Picketing is subject to careful restrictions,' 5 ' particularly wherever violence coming from picketing is manifested. In such
instances, application to a court of equity for an injunction is the usual
procedure, conceivably a better one than any arrangement under an extension
of the Act could be.' 5 2 Racketeering in unions is dealt with by the criminal
statutes concerning extortion and conspiracy, 5 3 and where interstate commerce is involved, racketeering activities of labor unions may be enjoined or
prosecuted under the federal anti-trust laws. 154 There is a problem, however, of preventing the labor unions from "coercing" and "intimidating"
workers to join their ranks. To solve this difficulty, it has been suggested

...
For other cases in which the employer is dealing with one union to the exclusion
of the other, see in re Pittsburgh Steel Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 256; in re Dwight Manufacturing
Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 309.
'See OAxEs, ORGANIZED

LAnOR AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICTS, Sec. 292 (1927).
'See Hellerstein, Picketing Legislation and the Courts, 10 N. C. L. REv. 158 (1932).
"mMagruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence upon the Development of Collective
Bqrgaining, 50 HA~v. L. Rav. 1071 at 1108- (1937).
"zSee People v. Barondess, 113 N. Y. 649, 31 N. E. 625 (1897) ; People v. Walczac,
315 Ill. 49, 145 N. E. 660 (1924) ; People v. Walsh, 322 Ill. 195, 153 N. E. 357 (1926).
See Legal Implications of Labor Racketeering, (1937) 37 CoL. L. R!v. 993.
'"Local 167, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U. S. 293
(1934). See Labor Injunctions Since the NRA, (1934) 43 Yma L. J. 625.
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that the section of the Act concerning this aspect of the unfair labor practices
on the part of the employer be extended to labor unions also.
While the Act has gone far to prevent strikes from occurring because of
the failure of the employer to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees, the other fifty per cent of strikes have to be reckoned with,
those concerning wages, hours, and working conditions. Collective bargaining does not guarantee a collective agreement. A young labor union which
has just organized and has received recognition from the employer will desire
to use its strength rather than accept what it considers to be the unfair offers
of the employer. Thus the Act may have" the effect not of reducing considerably the number of strikes, but merely decreasing them in one category
and increasing them in another.
It has been suggested that when the Board has defined an appropriate
unit, held an election, and certified representatives, at least the employer has
an authoritative determination of his duty. If some other labor organization,
wishing to dispute the decision of the Board, calls a strike against the employer obeying the Board's order, it is conceivable that such a strike could
be held illegal at common law on the grounds that while the Act does not
make the right to strike illegal, it does impose a duty upon the employer; and
a strike compelling a person to violate his legal duty may be held illegal. 5
It is apparent, however, that the problem of strikes will still be a pressing
one in the future. In considering its regulation, reference may be made to
the Railway Labor Act as a successful attempt on the part of the national
government to eliminate as far as possible, through mediation and arbitration,
strikes which are destructive to the industry.158 It is interesting to note
that the recent report of the former chairman of the Maritime Commission
favors an extension of the Railway Labor Act to the shipping industry, so
that through the offices of an arbitration and mediation commission many
of the strikes rampant in the industry and detrimental to its stability may
be prevented. 5 7 While it is true that the National Labor Relations Board
has been successful in holding elections for the purpose of selecting representatives for collective bargaining, it cannot prevent, under the present
Act, strikes caused by failure to reach an agreement concerning wages and
hours stipulations.
Thus it may prove feasible to extend arbitration and mediation to all
"See Taft, Circ. J., in Toledo, A. A. & N. M. Ry. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 730

(N. D. Ohio, 1893). See also Michaelson v. United States ex tel. C., St. P., M. & 0.

Ry., 291 Fed. 940, 945 (C. C. A. 7th 1923), rev'd on other grounds 266 U. S. 42 (1924).
See Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence upon the Development of Collective
Bargaining, (1937) 50 H,,,v. L. Rv. 1071 at 1107.
'See Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 567.
'See N. Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1938, p. 15, for the text of the letter sent by Chairman
Kennedy of the Maritime Commission to Senator Copeland, Chairman of the Committee

on Commerce.
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industries coming under the jurisdiction of the present Act in order that the
primary purpose of governmental regulation of labor relations may be realized,
namely, the securing of more stable conditions in interstate commerce through
the diminution of strikes. In this light, the National Labor Relations Act
appears to be the basis of a far-reaching governmental labor policy. When,
if ever, in the evolution of our labor legislation, that policy shall be completely attained, only the future can tell.

